The Liberal Assault on the Fourth Amendment
Christopher Slobogin
As construed by the Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement
regulates overt, non-regulatory government searches of homes, cars, and personal effects–and
virtually nothing else. This essay is primarily about how we got to this point. It is fashionable to
place much of the blame for today’s law on the Warren Court’s adoption of the malleable
expectation of privacy concept as the core value protected by the Fourth Amendment. But this
diagnosis fails to explain why even the more liberal justices have often gone along with many of
the privacy-diminishing holdings of the Court. This essay argues that three other liberal
dogmas–the probable cause-forever position, the individualized suspicion mantra, and the
obsession with exclusion as a remedy–are the primary reasons we have a Fourth Amendment
Lite. When a search requires probable cause to be constitutional, courts are naturally more
reluctant to denominate every police attempt to find evidence a search. When suspicion must be
individualized, they are more likely to gloss over the harms caused by investigations of groups.
And when the sole serious sanction for an illegal search or seizure is suppression at trial, many
judges have less sympathy for viable claims, because they cannot stomach dismissal of criminal
charges against guilty people. Of course, another explanation for the less-than-robust state of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is that the Supreme Court is concerned about shackling
government law enforcement efforts. But this essay also demonstrates that a more moderate
approach than the liberal canon can provide greater Fourth Amendment protection than the
current regime without further diminishing law enforcement effectiveness.
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The Liberal Assault on the Fourth Amendment
Christopher Slobogin*
As construed by the Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness
requirement regulates overt, non-regulatory government searches of homes, cars, and personal
effects–and virtually nothing else. According to the Court, the Fourth Amendment is mute about
undercover searches (inside the home or out), inspections of welfare mothers’ and probationers’
homes, flyovers of curtilage and trespasses on property beyond it, surveillance of public
movements, most compelled testing for drugs and alcohol, dog sniffs of cars and luggage, and
rummaging through garbage.1 And the Amendment is close to irrelevant in a host of other
situations, including subpoenas for documents, checkpoints for drunk driving and illegal
immigration, residential and business health and safety inspections, and searches of junkyards for
stolen parts.2 Under current constitutional doctrine, the government needs no justification to
engage in the first set of actions, and so little to carry out the second that it is virtually
unregulated.
This essay is not about whether this state of affairs is good or bad. Rather, it is about
how we got to this point. In the following pages, I try to lay out the etiology of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
A crucial initial assumption in this essay is that, at bottom, neither the language or the
legislative history of the Fourth Amendment drives the analysis on this issue. For instance,
contrary to current doctrine, the Court could have decided that all suspicionless efforts at
gathering evidence of crime are unreasonable,3 just as it could have held that home arrests do not
require a warrant and that searches of cars do not require probable cause,4 without offending
*
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either the text of the Amendment or the values of the Framers. I am looking for socio-political
explanations for our current Fourth Amendment doctrine, not formalistic ones.
The most obvious such explanation for the decisions referenced above is that the
Supreme Court is concerned about shackling government law enforcement efforts. Undoubtedly,
that is a large part of the answer. But it is not the entire story. As I have suggested elsewhere5
(and briefly explain again here), effective crime control and a more activist interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Other explanations for the Court’s less-than-robust reading of the Fourth Amendment
focus on the ironic consequences of decisions, mostly generated by the relatively “liberal”
Warren Court, that was meant to expand its scope. For instance, it is fashionable to place much
of the blame for today’s law on the Warren Court’s adoption of privacy as the core value
protected by the Fourth Amendment. This move, in Katz v. United States,6 was hailed at the
time as a major enhancement of constitutional protection against government intrusion. As many
have pointed out, however, because privacy is a manipulable concept, the Court has since found
it easy to declare that a large array of police actions–ranging from use of informants to public
surveillance and workplace drug testing–either do not implicate or are only limply protected by
the Fourth Amendment.7 This diagnosis has some attraction as well, but fails to explain why
even the more liberal justices have often gone along with many of the privacy-diminishing
holdings of the Court.
In this essay, I too suggest that the modern Court’s early expansive stances on the Fourth
Amendment have ultimately led to a diminished Fourth Amendment. But Katz’ expectation-ofprivacy formulation is not the culprit. Rather, three other liberal dogmas–what I call the
probable cause-forever position, the individualized suspicion mantra, and the obsession with
exclusion as a remedy–are the primary reasons we have a Fourth Amendment Lite. The endlogic of these three dogmas produce such unappealing results that even moderate and liberal
justices have balked at them, leaving us with a search and seizure jurisprudence that is much less
than it could be. When a search requires probable cause to be constitutional, courts are naturally
more reluctant to denominate every police attempt to find evidence a search. When suspicion
must be individualized, they are more likely to gloss over the harms caused by investigations of
groups. And when the sole serious sanction for an illegal search or seizure is suppression at trial,
many judges have less sympathy for viable claims, because they cannot stomach dismissal of
criminal charges against guilty people.
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I. Probable Cause Forever
Of course, probable cause is not required for every police action that is called a search or
seizure. Terry v. Ohio,8 a Warren Court decision, stands for the proposition that both detentions
short of arrest and patdowns of outer clothing are permissible on reasonable suspicion, which
represents a certainty level somewhere below the even-chance threshold often associated with
probable cause. The Terry Court was willing to relax Fourth Amendment strictures with respect
to stops and frisks because the government’s interest in “effective crime prevention and
detection” on the streets justified the “brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the
sanctity of the person” that these actions occasion.9
In the seizure context, the post-Warren Court has routinely relied on this balancing
approach–or what I have called the “proportionality principle”–in holding that several different
types of detentions short of an arrest may take place on less than probable cause.10 In the search
context, however, it has been much less willing to follow this route. Instead, the Court has
insisted, in the words of Justice Stewart in Katz, that “searches conducted . . . without prior
approval by judge of magistrate [and therefore without probable cause], are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.”11 Almost twenty years later, in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,12 a much more conservative
Court similarly stated, “[o]rdinarily, a search–even one that may permissibly be carried out
without a warrant–must be based upon ‘probable cause’ to believe that a violation has
occurred.”13
T.L.O. then went on to hold that probable cause was not required to search a school
child’s purse for evidence of disciplinary infractions, thereby creating the one major exception
(other than Terry’s frisk rule) to the probable cause-forever dogma. Labeled the “special needs”
doctrine, a phrase taken from Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in T.L.O., the exception requires
only that government action be “reasonable,”14 which in practice has meant that neither a warrant
or probable cause is required. But the special needs exception is usually only applicable when, as
in T.L.O., those conducting the government action are not police and are pursuing some end
other than ordinary criminal law enforcement (e.g., school disciplinary searches, drug testing for
administrative purposes, checkpoints for immigrants, or inspections of businesses for regulatory,
health and safety violations).15 Indeed, the classic statement of the special needs paradigm is that
it kicks in only when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
8
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warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.”16 The Court has on several occasions
called these special needs situations “exceptional” and “limited.”17 In other words, outside of
frisks, the usual law enforcement search for evidence of criminal activity requires probable
cause.18
While that outcome may please many who favor strong Fourth Amendment protection,
its ultimate effect has been just the reverse. For the consequence of the Court’s rigid adherence
to the probable cause standard for searches has been judicial reluctance to apply the latter term
even to government actions that clearly involve looking for evidence of crime. Instead, a wide
array of intrusive police actions–flyovers of backyards, open field trespasses, undercover
activity–have been immunized from Fourth Amendment strictures. Like the stop and frisk at
issue in Terry, these types of investigative techniques are usually exploratory, and thus usually
based on only a smidgeon of suspicion, rather than probable cause. And without these
techniques, probable cause might never be developed. When forced to choose between ending
such actions or permitting them whenever police want to use them, even many aggressive civil
liberations might choose the latter route. It is no surprise that the Supreme Court, which has to
worry about both sides of the balance, has done so. Thus, in holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not govern use of undercover agents to gain entry to the home, Chief Justice
Warren himself stated “[w]ere we to hold the deceptions of the agent in this case constitutionally
prohibited, we would come near to a rule that the use of undercover agents in any manner is
virtually unconstitutional per se.”19
Consider three other examples reflective of this dilemma. In United States v. Knotts20 the
Court declared that using a beeper to track public movements does not implicate the Fourth
Amendment. In United States v. Miller21 and Smith v. Maryland22 it held, respectively, that
government subpoenas for bank records and government requests for phone records do not
trigger Fourth Amendment protection. Much can be said against the Court’s rationale in these
cases which, put simply, is that anything we expose to others is no longer private vis-a-vis the
government; the Court’s stance that we assume the risk of police discovery in such situations has
been roundly criticized by scores of commentators.23 Yet had the Court decided to the contrary
in these three cases, its probable cause-forever dogma would have been triggered, thereby
banning public electronic tracking of any individual whom the police couldn’t already arrest, and
16
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invalidating most subpoenas, even those aimed at businesses and other organizations, despite the
fact that both practices are crucial first-stage law enforcement techniques. That prospect must
have been daunting. Indeed, even the “liberal” justices signed on to the unanimous Knotts
opinion, only Justices Brennan and Marshall wrote dissenting opinions in Miller, and only they
plus Stewart dissented in Smith; moreover, only Marshall was adamant about requiring a warrant
in the latter two cases.24
Given these developments, some have argued, as I noted above, that the real problem in
these cases is not the probable cause requirement but Katz’ adoption of privacy as the linchpin of
Fourth Amendment analysis. Various other concepts–among them, government-citizen trust,
coercion and property–have been proposed as substitutes.25 I have argued elsewhere that none of
these concepts satisfactorily capture the gravamen of the Fourth Amendment.26 But even
assuming one or more of these alternatives is conceptually viable, there is no reason to believe
that any of them would have fared better in dealing with the probable cause conundrum.
Consider property, probably the most commonly touted substitute for privacy as the core
Fourth Amendment value. Of course, privacy analysis takes property interests into account; one
has more of a privacy interest in a house one owns or rents than in a house that one temporarily
occupies as a guest. Commentators such as Morgan Cloud, however, seem to want a Fourth
Amendment “rooted in property theories.”27 Cloud prefers this approach in large part because,
he says, property concepts are less “malleable” than privacy concepts and thus less likely to
permit significant encroachments on the Fourth Amendment’s scope.28 But property doctrine is
eminently manipulable as well: back in the heyday of the property-oriented approach to the
Fourth Amendment the Court had no problem permitting suspicionless searches of privatelyowned open fields.29 The definition of criminal “instrumentalities” was also stretched beyond
recognition so that government could assert a superior possessory interest over personal
property,30 a ploy that would be vastly facilitated today by the advent of forfeiture statutes giving
government an interest in any item with a “nexus” to criminal activity.31 Worse yet, surveillance
24
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of any kind could easily be said to be ungoverned by the Fourth Amendment in a propertyoriented regime, since it does not involve physical trespass.32 In other words, even had the Court
adhered to a property-based Fourth Amendment, it could have (and undoubtedly would have)
succumbed to the anti-regulatory pressure created by the probable cause-forever position.
The allegiance to a unitary probable cause standard has still one other downside: the
minimization of ex ante review as a regulatory option for searches that don’t require probable
cause. As Justice Scalia stated in Griffin v. Wisconsin, “[t]he Constitution prescribes . . . that
where the matter is of such a nature as to require a judicial warrant, it is also of such a nature as
to require probable cause.”33 The converse of this statement, at least as far as the Court is
concerned, is that if probable cause is not required, neither is a warrant. Thus, the suggestion by
Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Griffin that the search of a probationer’s home should be
considered reasonable only if authorized by a judge was brusquely dismissed by the majority
once it found that such searches present a special needs situation outside normal law
enforcement.34 According to the majority, a court order based on less than probable cause is “a
combination that neither the text of the Constitution nor any of our prior decisions permits.”35
The idea that a court could issue an order on mere reasonable suspicion or something less in
connection with normal law enforcement would likely be even more oxymoronic to the justices
who joined this language.
In a variety of ways, then, the probable cause-forever dogma forces courts grappling with
the realities of law enforcement to exempt many varieties of surveillance from the Fourth
Amendment’s restrictions. That dogma is not required by the Fourth Amendment, however.
The Fourth Amendment only requires that searches and seizures be reasonable.
That declaration, of course, conjures up the specter of a Fourth Amendment swallowed
up entirely by the special needs exception. But there are other ways of conceptualizing
reasonableness. I have argued that the Fourth Amendment would be much better served through
the adoption of two principles–the aforementioned proportionality principle, and the exigency
principle.36 The proportionality principle allows courts to modulate the cause needed to carry
out a search depending upon its intrusiveness. Under the proportionality approach, searches of
houses would require more cause than searches of open fields, but both would require
justification, just as arrests require more cause than stops, but both are governed by the Fourth
Amendment. The exigency principle requires ex ante review of any non-exigent search–even
one that does not require probable cause under proportionality analysis. Yet that principle does
not have to be inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause if, as some Court
decisions seem to contemplate, one is willing to adopt a sliding scale definition of probable cause
32
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so that warrants can issue on varying degrees of cause,37 or if the ex ante review is conducted by
someone other than a judge or is called something besides a warrant, moves which even Scalia
has conceded are possible in special needs situations.38
The proportionality and exigency principles ameliorate the pressure created by the
probable cause-forever stance without sacrificing the core protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Under this regime, courts would be more willing to say that police attempts to find evidence are
“searches” because the consequence of such a holding would not be as dramatic. For instance,
undercover work, even if called a search, might only require probable cause when it involves
long-term infiltration.39 Observation of public activities like the tracking that occurred in Knotts
could more easily be denominated a Fourth Amendment event because they could be justified
on a lesser showing, given their lesser intrusiveness.40 And all subpoenas for records could more
comfortably be called searches because only subpoenas for personal records like those sought in
Miller or Smith would require heightened cause; subpoenas for impersonal, organizational
records could be obtained on the traditional relevance grounds.41
Under the proposed regime, then, courts could more easily avoid the temptation to define
the Fourth Amendment threshold in terms of assumptions of risk, and might be more willing to
speak of that threshold in the terms Katz originally stood for: expectations of privacy society
recognizes as reasonable.42 I do not pretend that their usefulness in resolving Fourth
Amendment conundrums alone is sufficient reason to adopt the proportionality and exigency
principles.43 But particularly in this day of heightened concern over security, a Fourth
37
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Amendment theory’s pragmatic impact on judicial decision-making is far from an irrelevant
consideration.
II. The Fixation on Individualized Suspicion
Hand in glove with the Court’s probable cause doctrine is the individualized suspicion
requirement. As the Court has stated, “A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the
absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”44 That precept is normally a wise one. But
it cannot be honored when large groups of people are subjected to searches or seizures, like those
that occur in connection with roadblocks, drug testing, public camera surveillance and data
mining. In these latter situations, an individualized suspicion requirement would stop the
government’s investigation dead in its tracks.
One response to this situation is to adhere to the individualized suspicion requirement and
simply prohibit group searches. But that solution is as “unreasonable” as the eradication of firststage investigative techniques that occurs under a probable cause-forever stance. Group searches
are an important means of keeping us safe, a fact even liberal justices recognize.
The Court’s approach, in contrast, has been to determine whether the group intrusion is a
special needs situation. If “ordinary law enforcement” is involved, the Court continues to
require individualized suspicion.45 In special needs situations, however, the Court has been
satisfied with a bland assertion by the government that the group search or seizure is meant to
deal with an unquantified “problem,” such as illegal immigration, drunk driving, business safety
violations, or substance abuse among customs agents and school children.46 In other words, just
as the probable cause dogma has encouraged a narrow definition of search, the individualized
suspicion dogma has left the Court with no tools for dealing with group searches, with the result
that it has essentially adopted a hands-off attitude toward them.
The proportionality principle counsels an intermediate approach, requiring what I call
“generalized suspicion.” It would permit group searches, but only if there is reason to believe
that the proportion of criminals likely to be so discovered roughly equals the hit rate associated
with the intrusion involved. For instance, if the government wants to conduct full searches of
everyone in a group, it should generally have to show why there is reason to believe that
approximately one out of two of those searches will produce evidence of crime (the statistical
equivalent of probable cause). Similarly, data mining using personal records of identifiable
individuals ought to be able to finger viable suspects approximately half the time, given the
intrusion involved.

44

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
Id.
46
See e.g., Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453-54 (1990) (noting the magnitude of the drunk driving
problem nationwide); Martinez Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-58 (1976) (noting that the illegal immigration problem is
“substantial”); Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. 661 (1995) (noting that drug infractions at the school in
question had increased in recent years).
45

9

At least one caveat to this approach should be recognized, however. When the
government can show the intrusion is aimed at preventing harm from a person or persons in the
group that is significant and imminent the cause requirement should probably be relaxed. This
exception recognizes a principle that has long been established in criminal law; for crimes like
drunk driving, for instance, we allow conviction of those who create a significant and imminent
harm even when the actual probability of harm posed by the defendant was low. We should be
able to conduct searches under like circumstances.47 Thus, for instance, the carnage that would
follow from a terrorist act on a plane justifies suspicionless searches of groups at airports despite
the extremely low likelihood that any one person boarding the plane is a hijacker. Similarly, as
the Court stated in dictum in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, “the Fourth Amendment would
almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist
attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route.”48
The “generalized suspicion” concept, combined with a strict dangerousness exception,
pours content into the reasonableness inquiry, which otherwise permits government to justify
actions affecting thousands of people based on vague assertions of need. If the concept
nonetheless strikes the reader as too technocratic or activist, consider the comments of Justice
Scalia in his dissent in National Treasury Employee’s Union v. Von Raab,49 where the majority
upheld drug testing of customs agents. Scalia was livid about the holding, calling it “a kind of
immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic opposition to drug use.”50 Not normally
associated with a fondness for detailed judicial oversight, Scalia nonetheless argued that the
Court should have to find some “social necessity” before approving a drug testing program, and
asserted that the majority provided no “real evidence of a real problem that will be solved by
urine testing of Customs Service employees;” rather the majority’s holding was based on
“nothing but speculation, and not very plausible speculation at that.”51 In support of this point,
he noted that only 5 agents out of 3,600 Customs employees had tested positive for drugs.52 In
other words, even Scalia recognizes that some type of concrete justification is needed before
courts affirm government intrusions.
The difficulty, of course, is determining what sort of justification is necessary. Let us
assume that drug testing deters and detects dangerous drug use. On that (big) assumption, would
100 positive tests have been enough to justify the drug testing program in Von Raab? Or would
30 have been sufficient? When is there “real evidence of a real problem”? The proportionality
principle, working in tandem with the generalized suspicion concept, provides a way to answer
these questions. Assuming that the invasion associated with drug testing using a blood test
should generally require probable cause (and that there is no airport-like significant and
imminent danger presented by drug-using customs agents), the Court in Von Raab should have
demanded that roughly half of the employees test positive in order to justify mass testing on a
47
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sustained basis. That number may seem high, but then so is the intrusiveness of a blood-drug
test.53
If one’s intuition is still that a mass drug testing program should not be so easily
frustrated, consider the scenario from another perspective. Over 7% of the American population
as a whole, and 19% of those between 18 and 25, have used illegal drugs in the past 30 days.54
If one believes, say, that 100 positive tests in the Von Raab sample (3% of the total) represents a
“real problem,” then the Fourth Amendment would present no obstacle to nationwide drug
testing (at least if one assumes that use of drugs by young adults can be just as dangerous as use
of drugs by customs agents). That result would be offensive to most, including, I would guess,
the majority in Von Raab. In short, Fourth Amendment analysis should mimic equal protection
rationality review “with bite,” if not strict scrutiny.55
The exigency principle also places limitations on group searches. As Scalia’s comments
in Griffin, noted in the previous section, indicate, the Court’s special needs jurisprudence not
only jettisons a warrant requirement, but appears to abandon all pretense of ex ante review. The
exigency principle, in contrast, would require such review before all non-exigent group searches,
special or not, just as is required when a single house, person, paper or effect is searched. The
rationale for this ex ante review requirement is the same as it is when individual search and
seizures are involved. Justice Jackson famously defended warrants as a means of forcing
“inferences [to] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”56 That rationale
doesn’t change simply because the government is no longer engaged in “ordinary” law
enforcement.
At the same time, the exigency principle does not pose the obstruction to law
enforcement objectives that the probable cause-forever and individualized suspicion
requirements do. Ex ante review would only be required when there is time to obtain it.
Furthermore, when the justification requirement is below probable cause, as is often true with
group searches, the second opinion does not have to come from a judge. For instance, school
locker searches might be approved by principals, and public camera installation might be
authorized by any high level, politically accountable official who is divorced from front-line law
enforcement.
53
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III. The Obsession with Exclusion
Since 1961, when the Supreme Court decided Mapp v. Ohio,57 exclusion has been the
remedy of choice when the Fourth Amendment is violated. The Mapp Court was convinced that
other remedies were “worthless and futile,” and that, in any event, both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments required suppression of illegally obtained evidence.58 The post-Warren Court has
completely eliminated the Fifth Amendment basis for the rule,59 and pretty much done away with
its Fourth Amendment foundation as well, insisting that it is merely a judicially-created remedy
designed to deter police misconduct.60 Yet suppression of the fruit of the illegality remains the
primary sanction for Fourth Amendment violations. In the meantime, administrative and
damages remedies have atrophied or been explicitly narrowed by a Supreme Court hostile to
lawsuits against law enforcement agents and their employers.61
Elsewhere I have discussed at length how the exclusionary rule undermines civil liberties,
albeit unintentionally and indirectly (as is true with the probable cause and individualized
suspicion dogmas).62 First, the rule is ineffective as a deterrent, in either the specific or general
sense, because it seldom comes into play and is only an indirect punishment when it does so.
Police know that most questionable searches and seizures never result in arrest or prosecution,
and that many of those that do will not trigger a suppression hearing because of the prevalence of
plea bargaining. When a hearing does take place, miscreant officers often prevail because of
perjury and the hindsight biasing effect of judicial knowledge that criminal evidence was found.
Even when evidence is suppressed, the prosecutor is hurt much more than the officer, whose
primary goal is obtaining “collars,” not convictions, and whose superiors are likely to be
sympathetic to aggressive policework as long as it does not result in egregious abuse.63 The
latter point also helps explain why the rule does not have much of a “systemic” effect either.
Research strongly suggests that training programs (run by these same superiors or supervisors
like them) routinely slight constitutional issues and that officers are not well-versed in Fourth
Amendment law.64
It is the damage to that law that is the exclusionary rule’s most insidious effect, however.
The exclusionary remedy ensures that the only Fourth Amendment claims most judges see are
57
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brought by guilty people seeking to elude conviction. Thus, the people responsible for
interpreting the Fourth Amendment are virtually never confronted by a breach of privacy claim
from an innocent individual. To the contrary, in the typical case they know that vindication of
the claim will diminish or end any possibility of punishing an obvious criminal. That is hardly a
prescription for a fair, open-minded assessment of Fourth Amendment issues.
The best argument for retaining the rule despite its flaws is that current alternatives to it
are worse. Police are not good at policing themselves, criminal prosecution against misbehaving
officers will usually be overkill, and damages suits are seldom brought and seldom won because
of plaintiffs’ ignorance of their rights, the expense of civil litigation, the inchoate nature of the
injury (which deters lawyers as well as potential plaintiffs from bringing suit), the biases of juries
and, as with the suppression remedy, the efficacy of police perjury. Furthermore, even if the
officer loses, he or she is usually indemnified, judgment proof, or both, minimizing the impact of
the verdict on the officer.65
A damages action need not be so punchless, however. I have proposed a different
damages regime, which would consist of several core components: (1) a liquidated
damages/penalty for all unconstitutional actions, preferably based on the average officer’s salary;
(2) non-indemnifiable personal liability, at the liquidated damages sum, of officers who
knowingly or recklessly violate the Fourth Amendment; (3) entity liability, at the liquidated
damages sum, for all other violations; (4) state-paid legal assistance for those with Fourth
Amendment claims; and (5) a judicial decisionmaker.66 With these components in place,
innocent people as well as criminals will have an incentive to bring Fourth Amendment claims,
officers who knowingly or recklessly violate the Fourth Amendment will receive direct,
unalloyed punishment, and departments will have a financial incentive to ensure that their
employees know the law. Just as important, judges will be more likely to acknowledge the true
base rate of unconstitutional actions, because they will see before them numerous people who
were searched and found to have no evidence of crime in their pockets, homes or records. Under
these conditions, judges are more likely to evaluate accurately the overall societal impact of
progovernment findings (as well as much less likely to condone perjury). In short, in a damages
regimes of the type described here judges will be forced to internalize the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment–protecting the privacy and autonomy interests of all citizens.
Additionally, a damages regime is a much better remedial fit for certain types of Fourth
Amendment violations. As the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hudson v. Michigan notes,
exclusion may meaningfully vindicate Fourth Amendment rules meant to “prevent[] the
government from seeing or taking evidence,” but it does not as clearly serve interests protected
by other rules.67 Thus in Hudson the Court rejected exclusion as a remedy for a violation of the
knock-and-announce rule, because that rule is meant to prevent unnecessary destruction of
property and minimize violence by or embarrassment of a surprised resident, interests which
have little to do with the subsequently seized evidence (for which the police in Hudson had
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probable cause and a warrant).68 A damages action compensating the individual for injury to
person or property would make much more sense in this situation. The same analysis suggests
that exclusion is not a good remedy for other execution rules, as well as post-search rules such as
record-keeping and periodic review requirements.69 Most important, as has often been pointed
out, exclusion provides no remedy for the innocent victims of police misconduct.
I am not arguing for replacement of the exclusionary rule with a damages regime,
although a persuasive argument to that effect can be made. Rather, I am saying that the
dominance of the exclusionary rule has been one of many reasons judicial endorsement of a
robust Fourth Amendment has been stymied. And I am saying that without a meaningful
damages regime, the Fourth Amendment law that we do have is not likely to make much of a
practical difference.
Conclusion
The Court’s adherence to the probable cause standard, the individualized suspicion
requirement, and the exclusionary remedy is either short-sighted or disingenuous (depending
upon the extent to which the justices understand and care about the effects of these precepts).
None of these doctrines is required by the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the proportionality and
exigency principles should govern, and a realistic damages regime instituted.
These latter recommendations are not ivory tower prescriptions. Chief Justice Warren
Burger proposed replacing the exclusionary rule with an administrative damages scheme similar
to the one I have outlined here.70 Despite its rejection in cases like Griffin, the exigency
principle embraces a commonsense notion that has been espoused in other Court opinions.71
And the all-important proportionality principle derives directly from Terry v Ohio.
The probable cause, individualized suspicion and exclusionary rule dogmas are all
revered by those who want a vigorous Fourth Amendment. Unfortunately, these dogmas have
backfired. They have fed, rather than restrained, the temptation to give government leeway in its
law enforcement efforts. The good news is that more moderate positions are both consistent with
the Fourth Amendment and more likely to lead to its full implementation.

68

Id.
See Slobogin, supra note 42, at 401-02 (arguing that exclusion is a poor fit when an arrest is unreasonably
executed, an inventory is not filed, or an arrest involves excessive force).
70
Bivens v. Six Named Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
71
See Whitebread & Slobogin, supra note 14, at 139, 141 (summarizing exceptions to warrant requirement).
69

14

